AFRICAN GROUP OF NEGOTIATORS
ON CLIMATE CHANGE

AFRICAN COMMON PLATFORM

A Consolidated Position for Equitable, Ambitious and Implementable Climate Action



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EXECUTIVE POLITICAL SUMMARY

Strategic context, key priorities and Africa's collective climate agenda



Executive Political Summary

The global climate regime is entering a critical phase that will define the credibility and effectiveness of the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement in responding to the urgency of climate change and advancing sustainable development. As Parties move from a primary focus of negotiations to implementation. The implementation includes implementation of 2025 NDCs, operationalisation of the UAE Consensus particularly implementation of the GGA and capitalisation of the FRLD and, advancing the New Quantified Goal on Climate Finance and the implementation of COP 30 outcomes, whilst launching the process leading to the second Global Stocktake (GST-2). There is an increasing need for a coherent and enduring strategic framework to guide Africa's engagement across the evolving climate negotiations. This period also coincides with Africa's preparations to host COP32 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia presenting a historic opportunity to elevate Africa's priorities and contribute to shaping a more equitable, implementation-focused and development-oriented global climate agenda.

For Africa, climate change - both the impacts and mitigations - remain one of the greatest threats to sustainable development, economic transformation, poverty eradication, food and water security, public health, infrastructure, biodiversity and resilient livelihoods. Although the continent has contributed only a small fraction of historical global greenhouse gas emissions, it continues to experience some of the most severe climate impacts while facing significant development deficits and constrained fiscal space. Addressing these challenges requires the full, balanced and faithful implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its legal instruments, which include the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement, guided by the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), in light of different national circumstances. Equally important is the recognition that climate action must reinforce, rather than undermine, Africa's right to sustainable development, poverty eradication and the aspirations of the African Union's Agenda 2063.

Against this backdrop, the African Common Platform (ACPf) provides a long-term strategic and political framework to guide Africa's engagement in the multilateral climate change process. The ACPf is not intended to serve as a conference-specific negotiating brief; rather, it provides a durable reference point that articulates Africa's shared vision for global climate governance, identifies the strategic conditions necessary to achieve that vision, and promotes coherence and consistency across successive negotiation cycles. It serves as a common compass for African negotiators, National Focal Points and Ministers in assessing emerging issues, navigating trade-offs, and safeguarding Africa's collective interests throughout the implementation of the Convention and its Paris Agreement.

Africa's priority outcomes include,

- A climate finance architecture that is adequate, predictable, responsive, primarily grant-based public finance, aligned with assessed needs of developing countries and delivered at scale.
- Material parity between mitigation and adaptation, including through a full operationalisation

of the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), with binding linkages to Means of Implementation (MoI) recognizing the centrality of grant-based adaption action support.

- Protection of Africa's development space based on differentiated mitigation pathways, as Africa is committed to the expansion of energy access to modern energy, industrialisation and economic transformation, enabled by access to technology, predictable and accessible climate finance.
- Technology development and transfer that enables local manufacturing, value addition and integration into global clean energy value chains.
- Integrity in forests, land use and carbon markets, so that Article 6 mechanisms generate genuine, additional finance and development benefit for Africa rather than low-cost offsets for others.
- Just Transitions that address all three pathways of mitigation-adaptation-finance that is equitable and lead to shared prosperity amongst and within nations;
- A response measures and an open and supportive international trade system anchored in the objectives of the Convention, including shielding African economies from unilateral climate-related trade measures.
- Climate action that prioritises agriculture, water, human health, mobility, oceans and mountains, and gender considerations amongst others, including as resourced, structural dimensions of adaptation and just transition.

The Platform is anchored in the, principles and provisions of the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement and is informed by the decisions of the Conference of the Parties (COP) and the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA), while remaining firmly grounded in Africa's shared development priorities.

It establishes the overarching principles, strategic objectives and common positions that guide Africa's engagement across the principal thematic areas of the climate negotiations, with the objective of promoting coherent, balanced and implementation-oriented outcomes that advance energy access and mitigation, climate resilience, sustainable development, just and equitable transitions, and enhanced international cooperation.

It is further premised on adequate, predictable, adequate and accessible means of implementation that are responsive to actual and projected needs of developing countries and addresses the needs and special circumstances of Africa, and advances a resilient, prosperous and sustainable future for the continent. In doing so, the ACPf seeks to strengthen Africa's collective voice in the multilateral process and provide a stable strategic foundation for the continent's engagement from the current implementation phase through the second Global Stocktake and beyond.

1

PURPOSE AND STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE AFRICAN COMMON PLATFORM

A long-term strategic framework for Africa's climate engagement



1. Purpose and Strategic Role of the African Common Platform

- The African Common Platform ('the Platform') is a long-term political document. It articulates a durable vision of what Africa wants in global climate governance, identifies the necessary conditions for realising that vision, and defines outcomes that would be prejudicial to Africa's interests and development.
- The Platform is not a conference-specific brief, it is rather a standing reference document that provides Lead Coordinators (LCs), National Focal Points (NFPs), AGN Chair and Ministers with a stable compass, and guiding benchmark for assessing trade-offs across the full range of multilateral climate negotiations over successive cycles.
- Climate negotiations are pervasive, complex and dynamic. Individual agenda items evolve rapidly, coalitions shift, and the pressure to make concessions in any given session is constant. The Platform provides a reference point that is independent of any single COP or inter- sessional round, enabling Africa to maintain coherence and resist fragmentation in the long term.
- The Platform is structured around the tenets of the African position, Africa's reading of the architecture of the Convention and its Paris Agreement, and Africa's vision for each thematic area. Within each thematic area, it sets out the context, Africa's strategic objectives, red lines, and linkages with other thematic areas.
- The Platform builds on the African Group's Algiers Platform of 2009 while reflecting the evolution of the climate regime under the Paris Agreement, a changing geopolitical environment impacting implementation of climate action, and the structural asymmetries that continue to confront African countries in the global economy and in the international climate architecture.
- To preserve both stability and relevance, the Platform should be reviewed on a defined cycle of at least once per GST cycle and otherwise adjusted only where a major legal or political development materially affects Africa's strategic interests.

2

TENETS OF THE AFRICAN COMMON POSITION

Equity, CBDR-RC, development space and climate justice



2.

Tenets of the African Common Position

- The African Group's departure point in all multilateral climate negotiations is the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Africa fully supports climate action grounded in a multilateral, rules-based system that respects the sovereignty of states and provides meaningful agency to all Parties - particularly Africa.
- The Paris Agreement is a further articulation of the Convention and must be interpreted and implemented consistently with the latter. No provision, decision or outcome under the Paris Agreement may be read to dilute the Convention's principles, provisions, differentiation or development safeguards, should there be differences in interpretation, the Convention interpretation shall prevail.
- Climate action must promote, and not hinder, the legitimate right of African countries to pursue sustainable development and poverty eradication. These rights are enshrined in the Convention's Preamble and in Articles 2 and 3. The special needs and circumstances of African countries must be explicitly recognised in all decisions, instruments and guidance produced under the UNFCCC.
- The global climate response must be underpinned by the principles articulated in Article 3 of the Convention, in particular equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), Africa consistently understands CBDR-RC as ', in the light of different national circumstances'. Africa contributes less than 4% of cumulative global emissions, excluding LULUCF, yet bears a disproportionate share of the adverse impacts of climate change including rising morbidity and mortality, food and water insecurity, displacement and increasing pressure on already constrained health systems. This asymmetry between historical causation and current consequence is the foundational equity claim in every African negotiating position.
- In line with the above, Africa's strategy in the negotiation rooms should emphasise on claiming the equitable share of the carbon budget, considering the continent's low historical contribution to cumulative emissions, and to support the continent's development agenda. In this regard, Africa's negotiations within the UNFCCC should shift focus and place emphasis on how much of the carbon budget Africa can claim and ensure differentiated pathways in the transitions.
- Climate action must not entrench or deepen the structural underdevelopment of Africa. Developed countries must demonstrate progression in both action and support consistent with Article 3 of the Paris Agreement, including through transparent ex ante communications under Article 9.5, ex post reporting through BTRs, and the delivery of finance at a scale commensurate with Africa's evolving needs.

- Equitable and Fair transitions are only achievable if the structural impediments that currently deny Africa energy sovereignty, food sovereignty, and industrial value addition are addressed as part of the global climate response. The Bretton Woods institutions, WTO trade rules, intellectual property regimes and the international financial architecture have collectively constrained African development. Climate action must not perpetuate these constraints; it should help dismantle them and provide normative impetus for fair international cooperation.
- Africa's engagement in multilateral climate negotiations is guided by a development-first logic. The continent must be enabled to pursue low-greenhouse-gas and climate-resilient development pathways that serve the needs and aspirations of its people, consistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement. Pursuing development and climate ambition is not a contradiction - it is the expression of climate justice.
- Any proposed negotiating outcome should therefore be assessed against three questions:
    - does it preserve Africa's development space?
    - does it protect differentiation and equity? And,
    - does it strengthen the predictability, adequacy and quality of support?

- The core principles applicable across all thematic areas should therefore include, Equity, CBDR-RC, development space, historical responsibility, grant-based finance.

3

AFRICA'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT (IN LIGHT OF THE CONVENTION)

Convention principles, equity and implementation



3. Africa's Understanding of the Paris Agreement (in light of the Convention)

- From Africa's perspective, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) remains the foundational legal and normative framework governing international climate cooperation. The Paris Agreement must therefore be interpreted and implemented in a manner consistent with the Convention's principles, particularly equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), in light of different national circumstances.

- Africa recognises the Paris Agreement as an instrument that enhances the implementation of the Convention (Article 2.1 of the Paris Agreement). While the Paris Agreement establishes a distinct procedural and institutional arrangement and creates obligations, it does not provide an independent normative basis that overrides the principles and obligations under the Convention. Interpretation must therefore maintain coherence between flexibility in implementation, and fidelity to Convention-based equity.

- Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, which imposed quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs) on a defined group of Parties, the Paris Agreement is organised around nationally determined communications, transparency and periodic collective assessment. Parties communicate NDCs under Article 4.2 and Adaptation Communications in Article 7.10, with developed countries additionally communicating *ex ante* finance information under Article 9.5. All Parties are bound by the progression logic in Article 3 in complying with these obligations.

- Parties carry corresponding *ex post* obligations through Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) on action, support needed and received by developing countries, and support provided and mobilised by developed countries. The transparency arrangements serve a specific systemic function: they generate the information base upon which collective assessment depends. National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs) and related instruments contribute to this information base and must be accorded commensurate political weight.

- The Paris Agreement establishes collective goals in Articles 2, 4.1, 7.1, 9.1 and 9.3, but Africa emphasises that these goals are rooted in the Convention's objective of stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication. The function of Article 14 the Global Stocktake (GST) is to assess collective progress towards these goals in a manner consistent with equity and best available science. The outcomes of the GST are intended to inform Parties in updating and enhancing action and support, and to strengthen international cooperation. From an African perspective, international cooperation is a collective responsibility with differentiated obligations under the Convention, not a burden to be shifted asymmetrically onto developing countries.

- The quality and completeness of information flowing through the Paris Agreement architecture is therefore of strategic importance. Imprecise or incomplete reporting - particularly on support provided by developed countries - undermines the GST's ability to assess collective progress, characterise the mitigation pathways needed to stay within 1.5°C without overshoot, and accurately measure the adaptation, loss and damage and development needs of African and other developing countries. Africa's long-term interest lies in strengthening both the provision and the quality of this information.

- Africa further understands the Convention as conferring an implementation and coordination mandate that extends beyond reporting. While real-world implementation through the deployment of technologies, mobilisation of finance and structural transformation of economies takes place within and beyond the UNFCCC, the Convention's enduring role is its orchestration function. It provides normative guidance and signals on climate action to the broader international cooperation ecosystem - based on the principles of the Convention and its Paris Agreement -, including multilateral development banks, bilateral institutions, international financial institutions, export credit agencies, trade bodies and standards-setting organisations. This orchestration role must be actively exercised through mechanisms such as the GST and preserved against efforts to narrow or dilute the Convention's authority in shaping global climate governance.

4

AFRICAN COMMON POSITION AND THEMATIC AREAS

Climate Resilience • Energy and Mitigation • Means of Implementation • Climate and Development • The Paris Ambition Cycle • Thematic-Sectoral



AFRICAN COMMON PLATFORM

4.1

CLIMATE RESILIENCE

Adaptation · Loss and Damage



4.1 Climate Resilience

A: Adaptation

The context of adaptation includes,

- Africa is the continent least responsible for climate change, contributing less than 4% of cumulative global greenhouse gas emissions, yet it is at the receiving end of some of the most severe impacts. GDP losses across agriculture, water, infrastructure, coastal systems and public health sectors are mounting, and the trajectory is worsening as global temperatures rise beyond 1.5°C[1].
- Adaptation capacity is highly correlated with the level of development. The ability of communities, economies and states to reduce vulnerability, absorb shocks and build resilience is determined by investment in social, economic and physical infrastructure. Africa's development deficit is therefore simultaneously an adaptation deficit.
- Adaptation finance for Africa is chronically and systematically inadequate. Estimated needs for adaptation amount to $56 billion per year, and that is an underestimate given the methodological challenges of costing of adaptation needs. Yet, according to UNEP's 2025 Adaptation Gap Report, adaptation finance needs in developing countries are 12 - 14 times current international public finance flows. A disproportionate share arrives as concessional loans rather than grants. Incurring unsustainable, unaffordable, and non-ending debt to respond to a crisis that Africa did not cause is structurally unjust.
- The Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) was proposed by the African Group of Negotiators in 2013 and established under Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement. Its purpose is to provide a unifying framework that drives political action and provision of finance by developed countries for adaptation. The UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience and any subsequent indicators or review processes should operationalise that original intent, not dilute it into a reporting exercise divorced from finance and implementation.

Africa engages with a view to achieve,

- Achieve material parity between adaptation and mitigation across the full range of implementation support - finance, technology, capacity building - as a durable structural outcome of the Paris Agreement ambition cycle.
- Adaptation framed as a global responsibility, not a domestic one. The obligation to address adaptation needs in developing countries is an expression of historical responsibility by developed countries. It is a debt owed - not a favour extended.
- Adaptation finance should be provided predominantly as public, grant-based, new and additional finance. The long-term position is that adaptation finance must be grant-based, with the quantum determined by assessed needs rather than by the willingness of developed countries to pay.

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1 Africa lost 5–15 per cent of gross domestic product per capita growth in the 1986 - 2015 period due to climate impacts (African Development Bank, 2019), despite its minimal contribution to emissions.

- Simplified access and, where possible direct access through national and regional institutions should be a standing African demand in adaptation-finance arrangements.
- Adaptation needs understood and quantified in relation to temperature scenarios. The scale of adaptation required at 1.5°C differs profoundly from that required at 2°C or above. The GGA must generate this granular understanding and use it to determine the obligations of developed countries.
- The GGA, including the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience and its indicators, to generate information - on both action and support - that flows directly and meaningfully into successive GSTs, enabling the ambition cycle to respond to actual adaptation realities rather than aspirational commitments.
- The UNFCCC regime should facilitate of NAPs and the GGA, through measurable implementation, finance, technology and capacity-building support, including how progress and support gaps should be assessed; The implementation NAPs and GGA should be guided by investment in structural development - social infrastructure, economic institutions and physical capital - recognised as the primary mechanism for building adaptive capacity over the long term.

Africa will not accept,

- Adaptation finance mobilisation targets that rely predominantly on private finance or on loans. Private finance instruments and insurance mechanisms transfer risk back onto vulnerable countries and are not substitutes for grant-based public finance.
- A GGA framework that lacks an explicit and enforceable link between the achievement of adaptation targets and the provision of means of implementation by developed countries. Targets without finance are not adaptation - they are a record of unmet need.
- Treatment of adaptation as a philanthropic or humanitarian gesture. Adaptation finance is an obligation arising from historical responsibility, not a discretionary act of generosity.
- Shifting the responsibility to national budgets in developing countries for adaptation as this goes against the principles of the Convention

Linkages with other areas under negotiation include; Finance - grant-based public finance is the enabling condition for adaptation action; Just Transition - investment in resilient infrastructure, food systems and social protection is integral to just transition pathways; Technology - technology development and transfer for climate-proofing infrastructure, water systems and agriculture and health systems is indispensable to adaptation at scale; GST - the GGA and its indicators must feed measurable, granular information on adaptation action and support into each GST cycle.

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B: Loss and Damage

The context of loss and damage includes,

- African countries face both rapid-onset catastrophic events - cyclones, floods, droughts, extreme heat - and slow-onset processes - sea-level rise, desertification, salinisation - that cause irreversible harm to lives, livelihoods, human health, ecosystems and cultural heritage. These losses and damages are the direct consequence of emissions produced overwhelmingly by developed countries.
- The Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage was established at COP27 and operationalised at COP28 as part of the Convention and Paris Agreement finance architecture. However, its capitalisation remains wholly inadequate relative to assessed needs.
- Loss and damage represent costs incurred beyond adaptation, as such loss and damage cannot be a substitute for adaptation finance. Where adaptation is a response to manageable climate risk, loss and damage addresses the residual harm that adaptation cannot prevent. The two must be clearly distinguished in both conceptual framing and financial architecture.

Africa engages with a view to achieve,

- Ensure a broad and permanent scope for loss and damage that includes rapid-onset catastrophic events, slow-onset processes, economic losses, non-economic losses, and losses to cultural heritage and ecosystems without hierarchy between categories.
- Loss and damage support grounded in accountability and reparative justice arising from historical responsibility. This is not a request for charity - it is a claim for responsibility and response, as such should be predominantly grant financed.
- Loss and damage finance must explicitly cover the costs of resettlement, rebuilding, and non-economic losses such as health impacts, cultural heritage, ecosystems and livelihoods, while ensuring the rights and dignity of displaced people remain at the core of any response.
- A capitalisation of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage that is at a scale commensurate with assessed and projected economic and non-economic losses, with new, additional, public grant-based finance as the dominant instrument, as such limited net incidence of developing countries.
- Prioritisation of public interventions over private sector-driven instruments such as parametric insurance, which shift risk back onto recipient countries and impose ongoing costs.
- Institutional capacity for both pre-disaster risk reduction and preparedness, and post-disaster recovery and rebuilding - including the additional incremental costs of building back better. Simplified, equitable and rapid access modalities - including direct access where feasible - that do not discriminate against the smallest and most vulnerable countries in Africa. Africa therefore calls for simplified, country-driven and nationally owned access modalities

Africa will not accept,

- Narrowing of the Fund's scope to exclude slow-onset events, non-economic losses or ecosystem losses.
- Capitalisation of the Fund primarily through private sources, parametric insurance products, or mechanisms that impose cost burdens on recipient countries.
- Capitalisation of the fund in a manner that is not consistent with actual and projected needs of developing countries for loss and damage
- Conflation of loss and damage finance with adaptation finance or development assistance. These are conceptually and legally distinct.

Linkages with other areas include, Finance - loss and damage finance must be additional to, and not drawn from, climate finance for mitigation and adaptation; Just Transition - cumulative economic and non-economic losses compound Africa's development gap and must be reflected in equity assessments; GST - loss and damage data and assessments must feed the GST information streams so the collective picture of harm is visible and drives enhanced action and support.

AFRICAN COMMON PLATFORM

4.2

ENERGY AND MITIGATION

Mitigation · Forests and Land Use · Carbon Markets



4.2 Energy and Mitigation

A: Mitigation

Thecontext for mitigation includes,

- Africa is grossly under-served in terms of modern energy access. Over 600 million Africans lack access to modern energy services, and industrial energy supply across the continent is wholly insufficient to underpin the structural economic transformation needed to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. This is not merely an energy deficit - it is a development deficit.
- Africa's existing energy systems are predominantly clean or low-emission or undersupplied. The continent's per capita emissions are among the lowest in the world. Africa's mitigation contribution to the global effort is therefore not premised on reducing existing emissions but on reducing future emissions as it expands its energy base to serve its people's needs.
- The right to promote sustainable development is a principle of the Convention (Art 3), and its Paris Agreement framed as "global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty" and also provides the same context of SD and poverty eradication in Article 4.1 the long-term goal on mitigation.
- The Convention and its Paris Agreement recognise differentiated pathways. Developed countries, as the historical and current emitters with the greatest capacity for transformation, must take the lead on deep, absolute economy-wide emission reductions. Developing countries, including African countries, must be supported to pursue low-emission development trajectories that meet their development needs.
- A significant number of African countries are also endowed with fossil fuel reserves - oil, gas and coal - that are central to their foreign exchange earnings, fiscal revenues and development finance. The right to use these resources to fund development transitions, consistent with CBDR-RC, must be explicitly recognised.
- Financing of just transitions is essential, to implement transitions. Furthermore, what was agreed in the first GST were equitable, orderly and just transitions away from fossil fuels. Equity cannot be dropped, and means providing support, as well as differentiated timing of transition pathways, in different national circumstances."

Africa engages with a view to achieve,

- Recognition of Africa's mitigation contribution as avoiding high-carbon lock-in while expanding a modern, predominantly clean energy base - not as reducing emissions it has not yet produced.
- Differentiated mitigation pathways formally embedded in the Convention and its Paris Agreement architecture, with developed countries taking the lead on absolute emission reductions and providing the financial and technological support that enables developing countries to leapfrog to clean energy systems.
- NDCs by developed countries that reflect steep, economy-wide absolute reductions consistent with keeping warming to 1.5°C, allowing development space for developing countries (particularly African countries), updated in each ambition cycle and assessed through the GST.

- Support - financial and technological - for African countries to expand renewable energy, grids, storage and industrial development, enabling energy access, low-emission growth and development objectives to be pursued simultaneously.
- Accounting frameworks that recognise avoided emissions as a genuine mitigation contribution, addressing the current structural bias in carbon accounting that rewards existing emitters while disadvantaging low-emission developing economies.
- Recognition of the right of African countries with fossil fuel reserves to use these resources to finance development transitions within the global carbon constraint, without being subjected to the same phase-down timelines and conditionalities applied to high-income fossil fuel exporters.
- Achievement of a just, orderly, equitable, and nationally determined transition to low-emission development, in pursuit of energy security, development needs, fiscal dependence, avoidance of stranded assets, in the context of just transitions and LT-LEDS, particularly for energy- importing countries, fossil-fuel producers and countries with very low current emissions.

Africa will not accept:

- Mitigation obligations imposed on Africa that are equivalent to those of major historical emitters, without account for differentiated responsibilities, capabilities and development needs.
- Carbon accounting frameworks that penalise avoided emissions, fail to recognise low-emission development trajectories, or require Africa to deforest before being compensated for conservation particularly in respect of land use and forest-based emissions.
- Pressure on African countries to phase-down fossil fuels on timelines equivalent to those of developed countries, absent commensurate support and without recognition of the developmental role of these resources in Africa's transition.
- Equivalence in phase-down obligations between African fossil fuel producers and high-income fossil fuel economies, absent recognition of the structural differences in their development contexts.

Linkages with other areas include, Just Transitions - expanding Africa's energy base is indivisible from the industrialisation agenda; Technology - renewable energy manufacturing and associated skills are preconditions for Africa's mitigation and industrialisation ambitions; Finance - concessional and grant-based finance is required to unlock investment at the scale needed for both development and mitigation; Cooperative approaches/market - ensure carbon accounting that also rewards avoiding emission mitigation options in low-emission developing economies.

B: Forests and Land Use

The context for forests and land use includes,

- Africa is home to significant forests, peatlands, savannah, grasslands, mangroves and other ecosystems, including world's most significant carbon sinks, including the Congo Basin tropical rainforest - the second largest tropical forest on earth - as well as extensive subtropical woodlands and grasslands.

- These ecosystems function as global climate infrastructure: they store carbon, contribute to adaptation, regulate water systems, support biodiversity, sustain food systems and provide livelihoods for millions of people. Yet the countries and communities that maintain these ecosystems receive insufficient and unpredictable compensation for the global climate service they provide.

- Article 5 of the Paris Agreement recognises the importance of conserving and enhancing sinks and reservoirs, including forests, and of supporting REDD+ and alternative policy approaches. GST-1 further elevated forests and land use by calling for enhanced efforts to halt and reverse deforestation and forest degradation by 2030, with enhanced support, finance, technology transfer and capacity-building. For Africa, this mandate must be implemented in the context of sustainable development, poverty eradication, food security, energy access and CBDR-RC. Deforestation in Africa pressures are driven primarily by structural development constraints: poverty, food security needs, demand for charcoal and biomass energy, land tenure insecurity, limited rural livelihood alternatives, weak value addition and extractive pressures from both domestic and international markets. Forest policy without development policy will fail. Halting deforestation requires addressing the development drivers of forest loss, not imposing conservation obligations without support.

- The current carbon finance and accounting approaches often rewards the reductions from already high deforestation baselines more readily than the continued maintenance of standing forest. This disadvantages high -forest, low-deforestation countries and undervalues avoided future emissions, ecosystem integrity and non-carbon benefits. The architecture must be reformed to rewards both avoid deforestation and the maintenance of intact ecosystems. This creates a structural perverse incentive by undervaluing standing forests and avoided future emissions, particularly in low-emission, high-forest countries. The architecture must be reformed.

- Recognition that Africa's forests cannot offset global emissions; and African communities require fair compensation for keeping their forests pristine.

Africa engages with a view to achieve:

- Recognition of African forests and land systems as global climate assets that provide measurable mitigation, adaptation, biodiversity, water-regulation and livelihood benefits, amongst others.
- Predictable, grant-based public finance, complemented by results-based payments for forest conservation, restoration, sustainable forest management and ecosystem protection. These payments should be treated as compensation for the global climate services, not as ordinary development assistance.
- Fair valuation of standing forests, especially in high-forest, low deforestation (HFLD) countries, including support for maintaining carbon sinks and ecosystem services before deforestation occurs.
- Land use frameworks under the UNFCCC that recognise the link between development, food security, energy access, land tenure, rural livelihoods and forest conservation, and that provide integrated support rather than imposing conditionalities.
- Reform of carbon accounting and carbon market rules to recognise avoided emissions, non-carbon benefits, permanence, leakage prevention, reversal-risk management, transparent MRV, environmental integrity, human rights, safeguards and equitable benefit-sharing.

- Rights-based and community-centred forest governance, including secure tenure, respect for indigenous Peoples and local communities, traditional knowledge systems, direct access to benefits and benefit-sharing, community-based monitoring and transparent grievance mechanisms.
- Technology transfer and capacity-building for national forest monitoring systems, geospatial tools, MRV, early warning systems, community-based monitoring, restoration planning and integrated landscape management.

Africa will not accept,

- Unilateral deforestation-free supply chain or analogous climate-related trade measures imposed by developed countries - applied without commensurate financial, technical and capacity-building support for African producers and Governments to comply.
- Carbon market arrangements that extract low-cost mitigation credits from Africa for developed country compliance while leaving African countries with higher-cost mitigation options and limited development benefit.
- Forest carbon projects that commodify African ecosystems without addressing poverty, land rights, food security, energy access, benefit-sharing, local livelihoods and the structural drivers of forest degradation.
- Conservation approaches that displace communities, restrict legitimate development needs, undermine food sovereignty or treat African forests as a cheap substitute for domestic mitigation by developed countries.
- Accounting systems that undervalue standing forests, fail to recognise HFLD countries, or create incentives that reward countries only after deforestation has occurred.

Linkages include Finance - adequate, predictable and grant-based finance is needed to address the development drivers of deforestation and to compensate African countries and communities for the global climate services; Response Measures - climate-related trade measures targeting land use, agriculture and deforestation must be addressed through the response measures forum with full participation of affected African countries; Carbon Markets - forest carbon credits must be governed by strong safeguards, host country authority, benefit -sharing and environmental integrity; Agriculture; forest action must be aligned with food security, land rights, agroforestry, sustainable value chains and rural development; Technology and Capacity building; MRV, geospatial systems, monitoring and institutional capacity are essential for implementation and access to finance.

C: Carbon Markets

The context of engaging in carbon markets includes,

- Carbon markets under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement offer African countries a potential source of climate finance and technology, as well as a mechanism to attract investment in clean development. However, in their current design they carry a fundamental structural risk: that the global burden of mitigation will be disproportionately met by harvesting low-cost options in Africa for the compliance needs of the global north.
- Africa’s mitigation options include a wide range of relatively low-cost nature-based and

renewable energy interventions. If these are absorbed into international carbon markets without appropriate safeguards, Africa's cheapest abatement options will be exploited by developed countries, leaving only high-cost options for Africa's own development needs.

Africa engages with a view to achieve,

- Carbon market safeguards that ensure the primary beneficiaries of Article 6 transactions are host countries, affected communities and national development strategies, with genuine and lasting co-benefits for development, industrialisation and social welfare.
- Design principles that prioritise transformative, high-cost mitigation activities over the extraction of low-cost options. Carbon markets should drive new and additional investment, not simply monetise what would have happened anyway.
- Technology and knowledge transfer - including project development capability, MRV systems, registry capacity and domestic market infrastructure - as an explicit and enforceable requirement of Article 6 transactions in African countries.
- Robust governance frameworks that give African governments meaningful oversight, approval authority, benefit-sharing rights and, safeguards for land rights, livelihood, food security, indigenous/local communities and women's participation; and control over authorisations and corresponding-adjustment decisions for credits generated on their territory.
- Recognition that African countries' cheapest domestic mitigation options should be addressed domestically, within their own NDC implementation, rather than transferred to developed country compliance.
- Sustainable development safeguards under Article 6 that include indicators for health protection, air quality, equitable benefit-sharing and community well-being.

Africa will not accept,

- That deviate from the fundamental Article 6 principles of environmental integrity, avoidance of double counting, corresponding adjustments, transparency, national ownership, benefit sharing and safeguards
- Markets structured to allow developed countries to defer domestic transformation by purchasing cheap credits from Africa, while Africa bears the long-term costs of having its best mitigation options depleted.
- Governance frameworks that exclude or marginalise African host country governments in the approval and oversight of carbon credit transactions, as such emphasise the nationally determined nature of involvement of carbon markets consistent with national development priorities and NDC implementation.
- Carbon market mechanisms that commodify African ecosystems without addressing the development drivers of ecosystem degradation or delivering meaningful community benefit.
- Transfer of mitigation responsibility by developed countries to developing countries at the expense of its development space.

  Linkages include with Mitigation: carbon market design must support, not undermine, Africa's own mitigation ambition and the integrity of its NDCs; Technology: technology transfer must be embedded as a co-benefit requirement, not an aspiration, in Article 6 transactions; Finance: carbon market revenues supplement but do not substitute for developed countries' obligations to provide public climate finance.

AFRICAN COMMON PLATFORM

4.3

MEANS OF IMPLEMENTATION

Finance · Technology · Capacity Building



4.3 Means of Implementation

A: Finance

Thecontext of finance includes,

- Developed countries have a legal obligation to provide climate finance to developing countries under the Convention and its Paris Agreement. Developing countries have a corresponding legal right to receiving climate finance. These are not a political aspiration - rather treaty obligations and rights. The persistent failure to meet this obligation at the necessary scale is one of the defining failures of the international climate process.
- Africa's climate finance needs are estimated in the hundreds of billions of dollars annually for NDCs implementation including their adaptation component, rising toward the trillions by mid-century.[2] The gap between needs and actual flows is vast and is widening as climate impacts intensify and adaptation costs escalate.
- The quality of climate finance matters as much as the quantum. More than half of climate finance to African and least developed countries arrives as loans, many at near-commercial rates. The cost of capital faced by African governments bears no relation to their historical contribution to the climate crisis. Debt-financed climate action compounds the fiscal vulnerabilities of African countries.
- Net financial flows tell a different story from gross flows. Through debt servicing, border adjustment taxes, transfer pricing, illicit financial flows, and the terms imposed by carbon market transactions, finance flows from the south to the north exceed inbound climate finance. This structural reality must be confronted in any honest accounting of the international climate finance system.
- The limits of the UNFCCC's own Financial Mechanism are well understood. The GCF, GEF and Adaptation Fund together cannot mobilise the full finance that Africa needs. The UNFCCC's role is therefore not only to govern these funds but to exercise its orchestration function - sending signals and providing normative guidance to the broader international finance architecture in accordance with the Convention and its Paris Agreement, including MDBs, bilateral institutions, the G20 and the international financial system.
- Debt sustainability and fiscal space as a critical challenge for climate finance: The challenge for climate finance in Africa is growing debt and shrinking fiscal space for investment in climate-resilient and low-emission development, and sustainable development priorities. In addition, climate finance is provided on terms that increase indebtedness of countries, although they are least responsible for climate impacts. The high borrowing costs, risk premiums, pro-cyclical credit assessments and recurrent debt distress divert scarce public resources from climate change action and development to debt servicing.

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2 UNFCCC, Second Needs Determination Report (NDR2): African countries, 53 reporting a total of 2,981 needs in their NDCs, of which nearly 47 per cent focused on adaptation (USD 430- 693 billion), 46 per cent on mitigation (970-979 billion) and around 7 per cent on crosscutting sectors (USD 3 billion). amounting to USD 1.6–1.9 trillion by 2030.

Africa engages with a view to achieve:

- Public international finance as the core of the climate finance system: grant-based finance for adaptation and the most vulnerable countries; highly concessional, non-debt-creating finance for mitigation and low-emission development. Concessionality should be benchmarked against the standards applied in developed countries' own domestic financing, not the punitive rates imposed on African borrowers.

- Reforms of the International Financial Architecture as a transformative decision guided by impartiality in application of standards of access such as the credit ratings that disenfranchises African countries perpetuating high cost of capital. Safeguarding multilateralism in the Bretton Wood institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in this context must pursued and never be compromised.

- Access to climate finance must be guided by science, the urgency to fight climate change, fast tracking adaptation and resilience creation in African economies against impacts orchestrated by rapid occurring climate losses and damages from climate change.

- A clear, agreed operational definition of climate finance - including rules on grant equivalence, concessionality, additionality and the treatment of mobilised private finance - that enables tracking, verification and accountability for developed-country obligations under Article 9 of the Paris Agreement. Without a shared definition, the practice of each developed country self-certifying what it reports as climate finance will persist.

- Developed countries to demonstrate progression in both action and support, consistent with Article 3 of the Paris Agreement. Article 9.5 biennial communications must be transparent, predictable and sufficiently granular to enable developing countries to plan implementation cycles within the Paris ambition cycle.

- The NCQG should be assessed against Africa's needs and against the quality of finance delivered - grant equivalence, accessibility, additionality, predictability and fiscal-space effects - and must not be used to dilute Article 9 obligations. The SCF assessment of needs compared to support provided to be a core, structured input into every GST. The gap between needs and finance provided must be made visible and must drive enhanced support commitments.

- Domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) understood correctly: not as African governments risk transfer mechanism on already vulnerable economies or self-financing climate action, but as the use of international climate finance to build domestic financial infrastructure, institutions and instruments to address externality driven economic pressures on the continent. Climate finance should build the capacity of African domestic financial systems to channel, allocate and account for investment at scale paying particular attention to micro, small and medium sized enterprises.

- Prioritisation of domestic financial sector development - national development banks, local capital markets and domestic private actors - as preferred implementation partners enabled by international climate finance innovative tools for absorption shocks accessioned by climate factors. With a recognition of the important yet complementary role of private finance to international public finance.

Africa will not accept:

- High interest or commercial loans - however concessional in name - as the primary instrument for adaptation finance. The principle that those who bear the least responsibility for the crisis should not incur debt to address it is non-negotiable.
- Inequities in the application of credit ratings that increases the cost of capital on African countries. Continued asymmetry in cost of capital: African countries paying rates that bear no relation to their contribution to the climate crisis.
- The absence of a shared operational definition of climate finance that is currently obscuring the extent of non-compliance with developed-country obligations further undermining the fulfilment of obligations under the Convention and Paris Agreement.
- Domestic resource mobilisation process that reduces the scale of international public finance obligations and shifts the burden of climate action onto African governments and communities.
- Access modalities administered by operating entities of the Convention and Paris Agreement that limit access to resources by African countries.

Linkages with Just Transition: finance flows must address transitional gaps that causes economic shocks and limits attainment of sustainable development objectives. Trade related illicit financial flows, global tax reform and trade-related revenue leakage as equity dimensions of the transition; GST: the SCF assessment of needs versus support provided must be a core structured input to successive GSTs, with outcomes generating guidance to the broader international cooperation ecosystem; Technology: public climate finance must be the enabling instrument for technology development and transfer, including industrial-scale clean energy and manufacturing.

B: Technology

The context for technology includes,

- Article 4 of the Convention and Article 10 of the Paris Agreement establish clear obligations for technology development and transfer. The full scope of these obligations encompasses cooperation in the development, application, diffusion and transfer of technologies - including production technologies. Delivery has been systematically inadequate, and the scope is rarely honoured beyond access to mature, commercially available technologies.
- Africa holds significant endowments of green minerals - cobalt, lithium, manganese, platinum group metals, graphite, among others - that are central to the global energy transition. The continent is, in effect, a primary input supplier to a global industrial revolution from which it captures minimal value. Trade rules, intellectual property regimes and the terms of mining concessions structurally prevent African countries from moving up the value chain.

- The current technology cooperation architecture primarily serves as a channel for the export of finished technologies from developed countries to African markets. Joint development, co-production, technology licensing and manufacturing transfer are the exception rather than the rule. This architecture perpetuates, rather than reduces, technological dependency.

Africa engages with a view to achieve:

- The full scope of technology obligations fulfilled: joint research and development, demonstration projects, diffusion, knowledge transfer and the transfer of production technologies - not merely access to commercially available end-products. More specifically, technology access, mitigation, local adaptation, domestic manufacturing, skills development and value addition inn African countries.
- The UNFCCC processes and the Technology Mechanism to generate clear signals in favour of intellectual property flexibilities, licensing arrangements and public-interest cooperation that enable African countries to develop and manufacture clean-energy and adaptation technologies domestically.
- Integration of African economies into clean-technology value chains - including mining, processing, refining, manufacturing and assembly - as an explicit long-term outcome of the Technology Mechanism and related cooperation arrangements. Policy guidance of the TEC to this effect should point a direction to policy makers& advisors.
- Technology cooperation structured to support Africa's industrialisation agenda: clean energy manufacturing, green hydrogen, battery technology, electric mobility, early warning systems, standards and certification capability, and related sectors that create employment and value addition. Calling for international cooperation within and outside the UNFCCC process in this regard.
- Engagement of the domestic private sector in African countries as a preferred technology partner, enabled by international climate finance and supported through public-private technology cooperation frameworks.
- New functions of the CTCN-Host institution arrangements should in the early design stages present a leeway for collective request by several African countries - particularly for regional integration projects - to the Technology Mechanism to respond to the emerging demand driven need to address Africa's priorities - sustainable industrialization, critical minerals value addition, energy access, food systems and trade, in the context of the Africa common position.

Africa will not accept:

- Technology cooperation limited to the export of finished products from developed to developing countries, without knowledge transfer, joint production or manufacturing capacity building.

- Technology transfer conditionalities that lock African countries into perpetual import dependency while the intellectual property of transformative technologies remains exclusively held by developed-country firms and governments

Linkages include: Industrialisation - technology access and local manufacturing are indispensable to Africa's industrialisation agenda and to the critical-minerals value-chain strategy; Finance - support for technology needs assessments, project development, demonstration, deployment and scaling; public international climate finance must be the primary enabler of technology cooperation, including the capitalisation of joint development facilities; Carbon Markets - technology transfer must be embedded as a binding co-benefit requirement in Article 6 transactions, not treated as an aspirational outcome. Just Transition Processes & GST outcomes; technology cuts across sectors and should be broadened for effective application.

C: Capacity Building

The context for capacity building includes:

- Effective participation in multilateral climate negotiations, and effective implementation of climate action at the national level, both require robust institutional capacity. African countries face persistent deficits in negotiating capacity, technical expertise, data infrastructure and policy coherence across sectoral ministries. These deficits are themselves a consequence of the structural underdevelopment that the UNFCCC system is meant to address.

- Capacity building under the UNFCCC has historically been fragmented, project-based and supply-driven: addressing the priorities of donors rather than the systemic needs of African countries. The Paris Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB) was established to bring greater coherence and country ownership to capacity building but has not yet fulfilled this potential.

Africa engages with a view to achieve:

- Systematic, long-term institutional capacity building - not episodic training - that builds durable national institutions capable of generating climate information required national policy-making, project development, project implementation and international reporting.

- The PCCB to operationalise a structured programme with measurable, country-owned outcomes, anchored in national institutions and regional centres of excellence, and reported through the GST as part of the support dimension of collective progress.

- Capacity building to encompass technology assessment and absorption capacity, financial management and accountability systems, data collection and analysis infrastructure, and policy coherence across ministries of finance, planning, energy, agriculture and environment.

- Capacity building for multilateral climate negotiations explicitly included, including legal, technical and economic analysis capacity, ensuring that African countries can participate meaningfully and with technical depth across all agenda items and negotiating tracks.

technical and economic analysis capacity, ensuring that African countries can participate meaningfully and with technical depth across all agenda items and negotiating tracks.

Africa will not accept,

- Capacity building treated as a substitute for, or set off against, finance and technology transfer obligations. These are distinct and cumulative obligations.
- Supply-driven, fragmented and short-term interventions that do not build durable national systems and that address donor priorities rather than African needs.

Linkages include: Finance - capacity building for financial management and accountability is a precondition for African countries to access, deploy and account for climate finance at scale; Technology - technology absorption capacity, or the ability to use, adapt and reproduce transferred technologies, must be built alongside technology transfer itself; Transparency - institutional data systems and analytical capacity are the foundation of meaningful participation in the Enhanced Transparency Framework.

AFRICAN COMMON PLATFORM

4.4

CLIMATE AND DEVELOPMENT

Just Transitions · Response Measures · Trade



4.4 Climate and Development

A: Just Transitions

The context for justtransitions includes,

- The Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) was established at COP27 to discuss pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement. The decision reflects African Group call for a discussion on pathways to achieving the goals of the PA- Article 2.1 in the context of Article 2.2 of the Paris Agreement.
- Africa's understanding of just transition is grounded in all three pathways of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement: the transition to low-greenhouse-gas development, the transition to climate-resilient development, and the finance flows necessary to achieve both. Just transition is not a workforce issue alone - it is a civilisational challenge.
- Africa's just transitions concerns are primarily at the international level: the equity dimensions of how the global transitions is being managed between states. The risk is that the global shift to a low-carbon economy deepens existing structural inequalities where clean technology value chains are captured by developed countries, that African fossil fuel revenues are curtailed without commensurate compensation, and that African countries are subjected to trade and industrial policy measures that undermine their own development prospects.
- The scope of just transitions as conceived by major developed countries and blocs is frequently narrowed to domestic workforce transitions in high-income economies. Africa's priorities - energy access, social protection, economic diversification, industrialisation, critical minerals value addition, energy access, food systems and trade, economic diversification - are systematically absent from these framings.

Africa engages with a view to achieve,

- The scope of the JTWP to encompass explicitly: energy access and the expansion of modern energy systems; industrialisation and manufacturing development; critical minerals value chains; trade and the international dimensions of equity; food systems and land use; and adaptation as a transition pathway.
- Livelihoods and the Informal Economy: The JTWP must explicitly address the informal sector, which constitutes the backbone of many African economies;
- A transition that reflects distributive, procedural and restorative justice in its outputs: addressing not only who bears the costs and benefits of transition, but also who has voice in shaping it, and how historic harms are accounted for. Recognising that just transitions include whole of economy and whole of society approach, sustainable development and the rights of workers amongst others.
- Outcomes of the JTWP to be synthesised as structured inputs into the GST, providing normative guidance to the UNFCCC mechanisms and the broader international cooperation ecosystem on how to address the fairness and equity dimensions of transition within their mandates.
- A structured implementation mechanism under the UNFCCC to coordinate just transition support for developing countries, with predictable and adequate finance and technology. Dialogue without means of implementation is not just transition.
- Just transition must address unilateral climate-related trade measures, including CBAM and supply chain regulations, as international equity dimensions of the transition, including how this affects the hard to abate, trade exposed industries that energy intensive and dependent

- on fossil fuels for energy. These measures impose costs on African economies without commensurate support and without recognition of CBDR-RC.

Africa will not accept,

- Outcomes limited to aspirational dialogue without normative signals, accountability mechanisms or finance and technology commitments.
- Just transition framed exclusively as a workforce and community transition in fossil fuel economies of developed countries, while Africa's development dimensions are excluded.
- Symmetry in phase-down obligations between African fossil fuel producers and high-income fossil fuel economies, imposed without recognition of the profound differences in their historical responsibility, fiscal dependency and development context.
- CBAM and equivalent unilateral trade measures treated as outside the scope of UNFCCC processes. These measures have direct and material impacts on African economies and on the equity of the global transition.

Linkages include: Finance - predictable, adequate and grant-based finance is the enabling condition for just transition pathways in African countries; Technology - technology development and transfer in clean-energy manufacturing and green industrialisation is the substantive content of a just transition for Africa; Response Measures - just transition and response measures discussions must be coordinated on trade-related equity dimensions to avoid duplication and to amplify Africa's position; GST - outcomes must flow into the GST as normative guidance for international cooperation, completing the ambition cycle.

B: Response Measures

The context for response measures includes,

- The response measures by developed countries to climate change - including domestic climate and energy policies, carbon pricing mechanisms, border adjustment taxes and supply chain regulations - have significant cross-border impacts on developing countries. These impacts manifest as reduced export revenues, market access restrictions, stranded assets and added compliance costs that developing countries did not negotiate and did not choose.
- The primary mandate for this work is established in paragraph 89 of 1/CP.16, which calls for the minimisation of negative impacts of response measures on developing countries. The Katowice Committee of Experts (KCI) provides the institutional forum. However, the forum's outputs have not yet translated into meaningful guidance to developed countries on modifying measures that harm developing economies.

Africa engages with a view to achieve,

- The response measures forum to focus squarely on its core mandate: minimising negative impacts of developed-country response measures on developing countries, including both current measures and those under development; including economic diversification of developing country economies
- Effective support for developing countries on *ex ante* assessment of the economic and social impacts of climate policies and response measures on African economies, particularly commodity-dependent and energy-intensive economies.
- The response measures forum to deliver four concrete functions: information sharing and modelling on existing and emerging measures; recommendations to governing bodies on addressing harmful impacts; capacity building in developing countries through modelling tools and analytical platforms; and facilitation of policies that maximise positive outcomes and mitigate negative cross-border consequences.
- CBAM, the EU Deforestation Regulation and analogous supply chain regulations explicitly addressed within the response measures forum as climate-related trade measures with direct developmental impacts on African countries.
- A Forum and its KCI synthesis of response measures information as a structured input into the GST, providing guidance and signals to Parties and to the international cooperation ecosystem on addressing the equity dimensions of climate-related trade and industrial policy.

Africa will not accept,

- Developed countries invoking domestic policy sovereignty to exempt their climate-related trade measures and industrial policies from scrutiny under the response measures forum.
- Narrowing of the forum's mandate to exclude climate-related trade measures such as CBAM or to limit its scope to non-trade policy areas.
- Response measures discussions that generate analysis but no guidance, recommendations or accountability for the countries whose policies are causing harm and potential redress with no redress mechanisms within or outside the UNFCCC.

Linkages with Just Transition: response measures and just transition are complementary tracks. Both must address the international equity dimensions of the global energy transition and be coordinated to reinforce one another; GST: synthesis of response-measures impacts must inform the GST's guidance to the international cooperation ecosystem; Finance: compensation and fiscal-space measures for the adverse impacts of response measures must be considered as part of the broader climate-finance architecture.

C: Climate Change and Trade

The context of engaging on climate change and trade includes,

- Global trade is deeply rooted in post 2nd World War structural underdevelopment of Africa that leads deficits in energy sovereignty, food sovereignty, and limited value addition, which can lead to structural inequities in the transitions. This has potential to constrain the legitimate right of African countries to pursue sustainable development and poverty eradication as enshrined in the Convention and Article 2 and Article 4 of the Paris Agreement.

- Furthermore, the African Group acknowledges that a supportive trade system can stimulate both sustainable economic growth as well as climate action and the realisation of the goals of Paris Agreement in respect of acting on climate change and building resilience.

- The engagement is further firmly grounded in Article 3.5 of the Convention. These provisions reaffirm that Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties. As such measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade which necessitates a defensive framing.

- The central concern is not limited to specific instruments such as the CBAM, or carbon pricing mechanisms but the broader architecture of trade and climate governance, and how it shapes development space, competitiveness, and transformation opportunities for African economies.

The African Group engages with a view to,

- Understanding trade measures, particularly unilateral trade measures, by developed countries that impact the development space of African countries such as levies, carbon border adjustments, regulatory measures, as such either limiting the fiscal or policy space, market access, extra-territorial compliance costs and competitiveness without support; as well as understanding trade rules that limit opportunities for African countries to industrialise through integration in technology value chains or fiscal space to support development and poverty eradication

- Develop redress measures and mechanisms within the legal remit of the two international agreements, UNFCCC and the WTO in respect of trade measures particularly by developed countries, through development of platforms/mechanisms for trade and climate nexus such that developing countries can be assisted to transition their export basket over time as well as contribute to the Paris Agreement goals in line with their NDCs

- Reform trade rules that perpetuate structural underdevelopment of Africa particularly that present a barrier towards scaling up of local content requirement, critical minerals beneficiation, amongst others to support energy and adaptation technology innovation ecosystems; this requires a technology and financial mechanism of the UNFCCC that supports provisions contained in Article 4.3 and 4.5 of the Convention and Article 9 and 10 of the Paris Agreement.

Key issues of concern include,

- Market access and competitiveness as climate-related trade measures such as carbon border adjustment mechanisms, carbon taxes, tariffs, and regulatory measures shape global trade conditions, with significant implications on export competitiveness and market access through additional costs, as such these can act as non-tariff barriers and undermine industrialisation and diversification prospects in Africa and emphasises that facilitating technology access is essential to ensure that trade-climate cooperation supports, rather than constrains, green industrial development in developing countries.
- Policy space, considering that fiscal and policy space are central to Africa's industrialisation and development objectives, and that subsidies and industrial policy tools in developed countries significantly shape global competitiveness while indirectly constraining the effective policy space available to developing countries. WTO disciplines on subsidies, local content requirements, and industrial policy tools continue to limit the ability of African countries to deploy development-oriented strategies for green industrialisation, value addition and economic diversification.
- Unequal exchange, expressing concern that insufficient attention has been given to unequal trade in the trade-climate dialogue beyond tariffs, taxes, and compliance measures, and identifies carbon markets and carbon pricing systems as examples of structural inequality where African carbon credits and ecosystem services are consistently undervalued relative to developed country markets. Further concerned that developing countries are exporting carbon sink capacity while developed countries import emissions rights, with these dynamics reinforced by global finance and trade architectures, and further notes that current valuation systems do not adequately reflect environmental and climate costs, leading to the persistent undervaluation of African ecosystems and natural capital.
- Considering that critical minerals are increasingly central to global green transition strategies, the African Group notes that current trade narratives remain largely Euro-centric, framing these resources as "critical for who" rather than reflecting Africa's development priorities and endowments, and emphasises the need to shift from a narrow focus on adjustment to a more inclusive approach to participation in global value chains. Understanding that Africa holds significant critical mineral endowments, the African Group underscores that trade rules and cooperation frameworks should support local processing, higher value addition, and the development of regional trade corridors for critical minerals, including through a balanced approach that recognises existing asymmetries in subsidies and taxation between developed and developing countries.
- Institutional coherence, the African Group notes that the trade–climate interface reflects a broader institutional fragmentation between the multilateral trading system (WTO) and the UNFCCC regime and underscores the need for coherent coordination between these systems to ensure mutually supportive outcomes for sustainable development and climate action. A response must not only the identification of adverse impacts but also appropriate institutional responses, including mechanisms to address and mitigate negative effects of trade-related climate measures on developing countries.

Linkages include response measures in respect of climate measures by developed countries on developing countries such as CBAM, and carbon pricing systems such as Article 6 and EU-ETS, subsidies such as those contained in the IRA which require fair platforms resolving impacts and defensive framing by the African Group; just transition work programme, technology development and transfer focussed primarily in industrialisation and economic development

AFRICAN COMMON PLATFORM

4.5

THE PARIS AMBITION CYCLE

Transparency · Global Stocktake · Periodic Review



4.5 The Paris Ambition Cycle

A: Enhanced Transparency Framework

The context for transparency includes,

- The Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF), established under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement and elaborated in the Katowice Package and in Glasgow, requires all Parties to report on climate action and support through Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs). BTRs include information on GHG emissions, progress in implementing and achieving NDC targets, information on adaptation and loss and damage, and on support needed and received (developing countries) and support provided (developed countries).
- The ETF is a means to both hold countries accountable of their obligations under the Agreement, and to provide detailed information on progress in meeting the goals of the Agreement, including on adaptation and support.
- The ETF applies to all Parties, but there are important differences in the way in which ETF applies to developed and developing countries - developed countries are required to report on support provided and mobilized, whereas developing countries are encouraged to report on support needed and received; developing countries can make use of flexibilities in the MPGs if there are national capacity constraints, and LDCs and SIDS have the additional flexibility to report when they are able (rather than on a biennial basis);
- For many African countries, producing high-quality BTRs is an institutional and technical challenge: data systems are incomplete and technical expertise is limited. To address these challenges, Article 13 contains provisions on the provision of support to developing countries for both capacity-building for reporting, and for the reporting process itself. More specific arrangements to implement these provisions are contained in subsequent decisions, and a standing agenda item was established under the CMA to consider the adequacy and effectiveness of these provisions.
- Key risks for African countries are; inadequate support for reporting, and for building sustainable national systems; erosion of flexibility provisions applicable to African countries for reporting; weakened reporting on key goals of the Agreement, including on adaptation and loss and damage, and of the provisions of the means of implementation, which undermines the assessment of collective progress; an imbalance which favours mitigation and neglects other key areas, including finance, adaptation and loss and damage;

Africa engages with a view to achieve,

- An ETF which provides clear and complete information on progress in meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement, from developed and developing countries, and supports the effective synthesis of this information, for consideration by the GST;
- An ETF which enhances the reporting capabilities of developing countries through the provision of financial support, capacity building support and technology transfer and development. The support being with a view of assisting developing countries for building durable national institutions, inventory systems, data-collection arrangements and analytical frameworks, amongst others that generate climate intelligence useful for both international reporting and domestic development planning.
- Granular, comparable information generated within the capacity of developing countries to provide it - aggregable to assess collective progress on both action and support at each GST cycle.

- Equal rigour applied to the reporting of developed-country support obligations - particularly under Article 9 and in BTR reporting on support provided and mobilised - as is applied to developing-country reporting on mitigation action. The transparency of support is as important as the transparency of action.
- Flexibility provisions preserved and not eroded over successive cycles, unless and until the capacity building support needed to meet enhanced requirements has been demonstrably delivered.

Africa will not accept,

- Transparency arrangements which do not provide adequate flexibility to developing countries;
- An imbalance in the thematic areas reported on, including the level of rigour and detail;
- The erosion of support for reporting and capacity-building for reporting for developing countries;

Linkages with other thematic areas; the ETF is cross-cutting and has connections with all thematic areas of the Agreement, to generate relevant information, and to provide support to develop the capacity to develop such information, to report information, to review the reported information, and to synthesis reported information. Mitigation, to assess progress in meeting the Agreement's temperature goal; Adaptation and loss and damage, to report on, synthesise and assess collective progress in meeting the GGA; Support, to assess progress in the provision of support for climate action, and for reporting, to developing countries; response measures is the visibility of socio-economic impacts both in-jurisdiction and cross-border arising from the implementation of response measures. The ETF should ultimately contribute to a Global Stocktake grounded in equity and CBDR-RC.

B: Global Stocktake

The GST context includes,

- The Global Stocktake is the Paris Agreement's central mechanism for assessing collective progress and driving enhanced ambition. GST-1, concluded at COP28, acknowledged the inadequacy of climate finance, the insufficiency of current mitigation commitments and the gap between adaptation needs and support provided. However, it fell short on operationalising equity and on structuring binding guidance to the international cooperation ecosystem.
- The GST is a recurring process - operating on a five-year cycle - that will shape successive rounds of NDCs, Adaptation Communications and financial commitments. Its design and outputs will determine whether the Paris ambition cycle can be made to deliver not only enhanced ambition but enhanced equity.

Africa engages with a view to achieve,

- The GST to produce two categories of outcome: first, strengthened ‘communications’ of action and support within the Paris ambition cycle; and second, structured guidance to the broader international cooperation ecosystem on equity, finance, technology, trade and fiscal-space constraints.
- Explicit recognition of Africa’s developmental constraints and development space requirements in every GST outcome. The GST must facilitate, not obstruct, the right of African countries to equitably exploit their natural resource endowments in pursuing the Sustainable Development Goals.
- The UNFCCC’s orchestration role strengthened through a structured information stream for international cooperation, including a Secretariat synthesis drawing on multiple platforms and providing normative guidance to MDBs, bilateral institutions, the G20 and the international financial system on equity in the global transition.
- The SCF needs assessment integrated as a core structured input, enabling the GST to compare needs against support provided, capacity building support provided, technology development and transferred, and to generate explicit guidance on closing the gap.
- Strengthening the Global Stocktake (GST) The AGN maintains that global progress cannot be measured by carbon metrics alone. The Global Stocktake must utilize ETF data to evaluate the distributive consequences of climate action. A global transition is only "successful" if it does not exacerbate existing development gaps or compromise the sovereign right to development of African nations.

Africa will not accept,

- The GST used as a platform for additional target-setting outside the Paris Agreement’s ambition cycle, or for the creation of parallel stocktaking processes that dilute the Convention’s differentiation framework.
- GST outcomes that address mitigation ambition without commensurate outcomes on support, capacity development, technology development and transfer obligations by developed countries. Ambition and support must be treated symmetrically.
- The orchestration role of the UNFCCC marginalised in favour of purely bilateral or MDB-led frameworks that operate without the equity principles and universal participation of the UNFCCC system.

Linkages with Finance: the SCF assessment of needs versus support provided is a core GST input and GST outcomes must generate guidance that closes the gap; Just Transition and Response Measures: both must feed synthesis reports into the GST information stream, completing the normative guidance loop; Transparency: the quality of BTRs and NAPs determines the quality of the GST information base, and capacity to report and capacity to stocktake must be built together.

C: The Periodic Review

The context for the Periodic Review,

- The Periodic Review under the Convention was initiated in the 2013–2015 period and operates on a seven-year cycle. It reviews not only the adequacy of the long-term global temperature goal but also the overall progress made in achieving it. It applies Convention-based differentiation and is grounded in the IPCC's scientific assessments. It is a distinct and important instrument, not a duplication of the GST.
- The sequencing of the next Periodic Review in relation to GST-2 will be important and must be managed with care so that the two processes reinforce, rather than crowd out, one another.

Africa engages with a view to ensure,

- The Periodic Review maintained as an independent, Convention-based process that cannot be conflated with or absorbed by the GST. The two processes serve different functions: the GST assesses progress under the Paris Agreement's ambition cycle; the Periodic Review assesses the adequacy of the temperature goal itself under the Convention including the implications of the overshoot.
- Outcomes of successive Periodic Reviews to inform the GST's assessment of temperature adequacy and to drive enhanced ambition in subsequent NDC cycles.
- The Periodic Review grounded in the best available science, including from the IPCC, and structured to surface the gap between commitments and the 1.5°C pathway - using this gap to drive accountability for those most responsible.

Africa will not accept,

- Merging the Periodic Review with the GST in a manner that removes Convention-based differentiation from the adequacy assessment or that dilutes the review's independence.
- Outcomes of the Periodic Review that address temperature adequacy without linking this to differentiated obligations for enhanced action and support.
- Linkages with GST: The Periodic Review and the GST are sequential and must be designed to be mutually reinforcing in driving the ambition cycle; Mitigation: Temperature adequacy findings from the Periodic Review must translate directly into enhanced mitigation obligations on developed countries in the subsequent NDC cycle.

AFRICAN COMMON PLATFORM

4.6

THEMATIC-SECTORAL

Agriculture · Oceans · Health · Human Mobility · Mountains · ACE · Gender



4.6 Thematic-Sectoral

A: Agriculture

The agriculture context includes,

- African food systems face compounding pressures from climate variability, land degradation, energy poverty, input cost dependency, water stress and extreme weather events. Agriculture is the primary livelihood of most Africans and the foundation of food sovereignty. Climate change threatens to reverse decades of development progress in rural communities across the continent.
- The sector is expected to transition from largely rain-fed, low-productivity systems to climate-smart, irrigated, technology-driven, and market-oriented agriculture with stronger regional value chains
- Agriculture under the UNFCCC is primarily an adaptation priority for Africa. The primary challenge is building the resilience of food systems, smallholder farmers and pastoralist communities to climate variability and change - not merely reducing agricultural emissions. Mitigation co-benefits should be facilitated but must not be imposed as conditionalities on adaptation support.
- Currently, climate finance allocated to these areas remains very limited. According to FAO (2025), only 20 percent of adaptation finance reaches the agrifood sector, constituting a mere one percent of total global climate finance. Priority should be given to ensuring the developed countries unlock financial flows for climate action in Agriculture and Food Security in developing countries.
- It is also extremely important how the financing is offered. Grant-based and concessional finance from developed countries, including through channels such as the GCF, GEF, and Adaptation Fund, remain essential to fill financing gaps.
- Climate-related trade measures, including the EU Deforestation Regulation and analogous supply chain instruments, are imposing direct compliance costs on African agricultural and forestry exporters. These measures were designed in developed countries for developed-country contexts and are being applied to African producers without commensurate support and without genuine consultation.
- Africa’s integration into global agricultural value chains is constrained by trade barriers, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, and market access restrictions that have nothing to do with climate but are being compounded by new climate-related trade measures. A long-term agenda requires addressing both layers of constraint.

Africa engages with a view to ensure that,

- UNFCCC processes to facilitate financial and technical support for the implementation of national agriculture, food-system and land-use strategies, drawing on the Financial Mechanism and providing normative guidance to the broader international development-finance architecture.

- Make access to climate funds especially for adaptation less stringent and sufficient to address the adaptation requirements through grant-based adaptation finance, agricultural risk finance, insurance and locally appropriate financial instruments.
- Promoting access to sustainable and affordable technologies to support production and to advance food sovereignty, climate-resilient crop varieties, sustainable soil management, precision water use, agroecology and post-harvest storage technologies - delivered as genuine transfer, not as commercial export to facilitate local processing, value addition, resilient seed systems, irrigation, storage, digital agriculture and regional agricultural value chains
- Agricultural growth should be achieved without further deforestation or environmental degradation. Africa transitions toward high-yield, regenerative, and adaptive farming systems that protect forests, grasslands, biodiversity, and water resources. Restoring degraded landscapes and promoting sustainable land management will position the continent as a major global carbon sink, contributing to climate mitigation while enhancing ecosystem resilience and long-term agricultural productivity.
- Safeguards to ensure that engagement with carbon markets does not compromise food production, land rights, water access or the adaptation mandate of the agriculture sector. The primary purpose of agricultural engagement with climate finance is adaptation, not carbon trading.
- Climate-related trade measures addressed through UNFCCC processes, including the response measures forum, with binding commitments by developed countries to provide transition support and to mitigate the economic impacts on African producers.
- Integration of African agri-food economies into global value chains on equitable terms: addressing trade barriers, building processing and value-addition capacity, and providing technology access that enables African countries to export processed agricultural products rather than raw commodities.

Africa will not accept,

- Climate-related trade measures such as the EU Deforestation Regulation applied without commensurate financial and technical support for transition, and without formal channels in UNFCCC processes for addressing their impacts on African countries.
- Carbon market engagement in agriculture that displaces smallholder farmers, undermines land rights or generates credits primarily for the benefit of international buyers without material benefit to farming communities.
- Agricultural support conditioned on the adoption of mitigation targets for a sector that is primarily an adaptation priority for Africa.

Linkages with Finance: adequate, accessible and grant-based finance is required to implement climate-resilient agriculture, food security and food systems at national scale; Promoting affordable agriculture insurance to derisk agri-sector, but also other insurance instruments that cushion farmers during periods of adverse weather and market contraction. Technology: transfer of agricultural climate technologies - resilient varieties, promotion of local crop varieties that have adaptation, transformational and nutrition capabilities e.g. cassava, sweet potatoes, pulses etc, water management and low-emission farming systems - is integral to long-term food sovereignty; Response Measures: climate-related trade measures in agriculture and forestry must be addressed through the response measures forum with full participation of affected African countries; Just Transition: equitable integration of African smallholder and commercial farmers into global value chains is a core dimension of just transition for Africa. Just transition in the context of Africa must guarantee the above requirements.

B: Ocean and Ocean-Based Climate Action

The ocean context includes,

- Africa is an oceanic continent, where many African countries are coastal or island states, including several Small Island Developing States, with large and growing coastal populations whose food security, employment, government revenue and cultural heritage depend on fisheries, tourism, ports and other ocean-based livelihoods.
- African coastal and marine systems face intensifying and compounding pressures - sea-level rise, ocean warming, ocean acidification, coral bleaching, coastal erosion, saltwater intrusion, marine heatwaves, shifting fish stocks, extreme weather events and pollution - that African countries did not cause and have limited fiscal or technical capacity to absorb.
- Mangroves, seagrasses, coral reefs, salt marshes and other coastal wetlands function as both frontline climate defences and significant carbon sinks, protecting coastal communities and infrastructure from storm surge and erosion while storing carbon at rates that make their conservation a genuine mitigation and adaptation asset, not merely an environmental amenity.
- Small-scale and artisanal fisheries, which form the backbone of many coastal economies and household food security, are already experiencing disrupted catches and displaced fish stocks as ocean conditions change, with direct consequences for nutrition, livelihoods and social stability.
- Despite this exposure, ocean and coastal resilience remains under-integrated into the core architecture of the Convention and its Paris Agreement - in adaptation finance, National Adaptation Plans and NDCs - relative to its material importance to African development.
- Africa's blue economy, already recognised through the African Union's Blue Economy Strategy and the 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy, represents a significant and still largely untapped avenue for economic diversification, employment and industrialisation, provided it is pursued in a climate-resilient, ecosystem-based and equitable manner.
- The UNFCCC's own engagement on oceans, including the Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue under SBSTA, remains process-oriented and has not yet translated into finance, technology or capacity outcomes at the scale African coastal and island states require.

Africa engages with a view to achieve,

- Full and explicit recognition of ocean and coastal resilience as a core dimension of adaptation within the Paris ambition cycle - including in National Adaptation Plans, NDCs and the Global Goal on Adaptation - rather than treatment as a peripheral or optional theme.
- Adequate, predictable, accessible, grant-based and highly concessional finance for ocean and coastal adaptation, including simplified and direct access for African coastal states and Small Island Developing States, consistent with Africa's broader finance position.
- Ecosystem-based and nature-based adaptation - restoration and protection of mangroves, seagrasses, coral reefs, salt marshes and coastal wetlands - recognised and financed as legitimate, cost-effective adaptation infrastructure, not as a lesser substitute for hard infrastructure investment.
- Strengthened ocean science, observation, data and early-warning systems for African coastal and island states, delivered through technology transfer and capacity-building consistent with Articles 10 and 11 of the Paris Agreement, to close the current forecasting and data gap.

- Recognition of climate-resilient fisheries and aquaculture as a food-security and livelihoods priority, with support for adaptive management of shifting stocks and protection of artisanal and small-scale fishing communities.

- Support for sustainable, inclusive and climate-resilient blue-economy development, led and owned by African countries and regional institutions, as a legitimate development and diversification pathway consistent with Agenda 2063.

- Explicit recognition and coverage of sea-level rise, coastal erosion, saltwater intrusion and other slow-onset coastal impacts within the scope and financing of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage, including support for resettlement and preservation of cultural and heritage sites where avoidance is no longer possible.

- Where ocean- and coastal-based mitigation and blue-carbon approaches are pursued, that they operate under robust governance, environmental integrity and benefit-sharing safeguards, with host countries and coastal communities as primary beneficiaries.

- Strengthened institutional and technical capacity for African coastal and island states to participate meaningfully in ocean-climate science, negotiations and blue-carbon governance, channelled through existing regional and continental frameworks rather than new parallel mechanisms.

- Coherence between UNFCCC ocean-climate work and Africa's own continental frameworks, so that international climate finance and cooperation reinforce, rather than duplicate or bypass, African-owned blue-economy and maritime strategies.

Africa will not accept,

- Blue-carbon or ocean-based offset arrangements that extract low-cost mitigation outcomes from African coastal and marine ecosystems for the compliance needs of developed countries, while leaving African coastal communities to bear the residual costs of ecosystem loss.

- Blue-carbon or marine conservation arrangements that restrict or displace the tenure, food security or livelihoods of coastal and fishing communities, or that are agreed without their meaningful participation.

- Treatment of ocean-based mitigation or blue carbon as a substitute for deep, absolute emission reductions by major historical emitters, or as a basis for delaying such reductions.

- Ocean-related climate finance delivered predominantly as loans, private instruments or insurance products that transfer risk back onto vulnerable coastal states and Small Island Developing States.

- New institutional layers or reporting requirements on ocean and climate that duplicate, or are delinked from, the existing adaptation, finance and loss-and-damage architecture under the Convention and its Paris Agreement.

C: Human health

The context for human health includes,

- The Paris Agreement in its Article 2.1 aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by … reducing impacts of climate change. As such health should be seen as a crosscutting issue across all thematic areas which include mitigation, adaptation with support being commensurate with the associated impacts.
- Furthermore, Article 4(1)(f) of the Convention asserts that climate action should minimise adverse impacts on public health and contribute to resilient, equitable, and sustainable development.
- Despite limited contribution to global emissions, health outcomes are affected in various ways including respiratory illnesses from an energy perspective, but mainly on impacts of climate change related to mortality from extreme events, heat stress, non-communicable diseases, water borne diseases, zoonosis, vector borne diseases, amongst others - which makes health impacts primarily an adaptation and development issue for Africa
- The African Group further recognise that health impacts and disruptions to essential services - health infrastructure and health systems - as important dimensions of economic and non-economic loss, which makes health relevant even for loss and damage. The relevance of Article 9,10 and 11 of the Paris Agreement therefore should also be at the center of a global response in a cross-cutting manner.

Africa engages with a view to achieve,

- Enhanced understanding of climate impacts on human health and systems including the social and economic burden to African countries, including technology cooperation and transfer for supporting climate-informed disease surveillance, early warning systems, digital health platforms, interoperable climate-health information systems, and resilient health infrastructure.

- Improved tracking of climate finance that supports measurable health outcomes, with programmatic approaches for climate and health under the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, based on predictable grant-based support, readiness, project preparation, accreditation support and simplified access modalities for climate-health programmes, including direct access by African countries.

- Transitions should ensure that decarbonization does not displace informal workers but instead provides adequate occupational health, social protection, protection from heat stress and climate-sensitive occupational risks, formalization opportunities, and localized economic resilience. Recognition of the health and right to health of just transitions, including equitable access to health services, health assessments for the transitions, and equitable access to clean energy.

- Human health and climate-resilient health systems recognised as essential pillars of resilience, adaptation, and sustainable development under the GGA, JTWP, RM, financial mechanism, technology mechanism, capacity building.

Africa will not accept,

- A health framing that is only limited to positive impacts of climate action - particularly in respect of mitigation - at the expense of disproportionally higher negative impacts for African countries
- A transfer of technologies and funding modalities that perpetuate the dependence and unjustifiable profiting of global north multilateral companies, particularly that climate change impacts are primarily driven by emissions from the global north

Linkages include systematic consideration of health evidence, indicators within the GGA, tracked within the ETF to understand outcomes, for recommendation within the successive Global Stocktakes. It further includes tracking of means of implementation finance, technology development and transfer and capacity building towards climate and health action and support. Noting the health theme includes health systems, also a consideration of the associated institutional arrangements.

D: Human Mobility

The context for human mobility includes,

- Africa is already facing climate change driven human mobility, due to the crisis of habitability, livelihoods and mobility, as intensifying hazards combine with conflict, poverty, rapid urbanisation and limited adaptive capacity which drives displacement, migration, cyclical movements and trapped populations.
- Millions of Africans are displaced from their homes and lands when disasters strike and when their livelihoods are affected by climate change. Disaster displacement is not voluntary, but a survival strategy. However, planned migration (e.g. to urban centres to seek work) can help families and communities adapt through livelihoods diversification and through remittances sent back to family members highlighting the urgent need for planned, safe and dignified human mobility whether temporary or permanent.
- Recognising that human mobility in Africa arises from multiple and intersecting factors with climate change acting as a risk multiplier. Factors include the crisis of habitability, livelihoods and mobility, as intensifying hazards combine with conflict, poverty, rapid urbanization, environmental degradation and limited adaptive capacity. Climate change compounds these vulnerabilities factors by placing additional pressure on livelihoods, human settlements and habitability, thereby contributing to internal displacement and migration
- Africa underscores the need for a comprehensive, human rights-based and development-orientated response that strengthens adaptation and resilience, prevents and addresses displacement, supports safe, orderly and regular migration and considers planned relocation only where necessary and through inclusive consultation with affected communities and promote cooperation at national, regional and continental levels.
- Climate mobility is already recognised within the UNFCCC framework, in the Cancún Adaptation Framework explicitly calls on Parties to undertake “measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation on climate change - induced displacement, migration and planned relocation” (Decision 1/CP.16, para 14(f)). Accordingly, discussions on climate-related human mobility should be advanced within existing multilateral frameworks, consistent with adaption, resilience-building and sustainable development objectives.

- Furthermore, the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) and its Task Force on Displacement (TFD) provides guidance on "measures to address climate change induced displacement" and established the TFD to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement-related impacts (Decision 1/CP.21, para. 49).
- Human mobility is also relevant in other UNFCCC workstreams such as the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), negotiations on the NCQG, the Just Transition Work Programme, Climate Finance, the Gender workstream as well as and work programmes on technology, capacity building and transparency are relevant for human mobility.
- African States have advanced continent-led initiatives such as the Kampala Ministerial Declaration on Migration, Environment and Climate Change (KDMECC) and regional processes under RECs such as IGAD and ECOWAS. The African Union Commission is currently in the process of developing a new AU Migration and Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan, which will integrate the KDMECC.

Africa engages with a view to achieve,

- An acknowledgement of the growing use of the term "climate mobility" in reference to displacement, migration, planned relocation associated with the adverse effects of climate change, while reaffirming that human mobility is multi-dimensional and driven by multiple and intersecting factors. Climate change should therefore be understood as a compounding factor that may intensify existing social, economic, development and environmental vulnerabilities. Responses should be human rights based, gender responsive, conflict sensitive, people centred and advance Africa's sustainable development, adaptation and resilience objectives.
- Strengthened integration of human mobility in adaptation and loss and damage, including through methodologies to quantify, document and respond to climate-related health losses and damages, including economic and non-economic losses, through the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage and related arrangements
- Africa underlines that human mobility consequences associated with the adverse impacts of climate change must be considered through a lens of climate justice, sustainable development and common but differentiated responsibilities respective of capabilities.
- Financing for loss and damage must ensure that migration and displacement are adequately addressed to safeguard lives, livelihoods, and social cohesion across the continent in the context of responsibility not charity, which should be built in programming of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC.
- Recognition that climate mobility, if well-managed, can be an adaptation strategy and leveraged for sustainable development, therefore the integration of climate mobility in NAPs, NDCs, the Just Transition WP and other climate change plans, policies and mechanisms must be encouraged.

Africa will not accept,

- The securitisation of human mobility and climate change and underscores that climate change is fundamentally an economic and developmental issue. These interconnected matters should remain within inclusive, multilateral and consensus processes, rather than transferred under the authority of the UN Security Council, where decision-making is concentrated amongst a few.

Linkages include Adaptation in respect of the NWP, NAPs, AdCOMs, and GGA amongst others with a view to supporting the understanding of risks and impacts, planning, implementation, and the monitoring and evaluation learning cycle; Loss and damage in interventions to avert, minimise and address loss human mobility, including within the task force for displacement; means of implementation in respect of scoping human mobility related aspects in programming, technical support and capacity building for developing countries.

E: Mountains and Climate

The context for Mountain and Climate,

- Mountain ecosystems are vital centers of biological and cultural diversity, providing essential ecosystem services to both local and downstream communities. Often referred to as the world's "water towers," mountains are the source of major global rivers and supply critical freshwater for human survival, agriculture, and ecosystem integrity. Beyond water provision, mountains support tourism, food production, forestry, wildlife conservation, and biodiversity protection. They host unique, specialized habitats while supporting the livelihoods and cultural heritage of mountain communities.
- In Africa, major river basins including the Nile, Congo, Niger, and Orange originate in or depend heavily on mountainous catchment areas. These systems provide downstream populations with water for domestic use, industry, irrigation, and hydropower generation. Despite their value, African mountain ecosystems face mounting pressures from climate change, land degradation, and shifting land use. These dynamics trigger more frequent droughts, erratic rainfall, rising temperatures, and emerging crop pests and diseases.
- Global recognition of mountain protection began formally with Agenda 21 at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and was subsequently embedded within international environmental frameworks. Building on this momentum, attention to mountain-related climate risks has increased within the UNFCCC process. Some Parties have called for a more structured and sustained consideration of mountains and climate change, including proposals to institutionalise dedicated dialogues and technical exchanges to address the acute vulnerabilities of mountain ecosystems and strengthen long-term resilience within global climate policy processes.

Africa engages with the view of,

- Deepening understanding of the vulnerability of mountain communities, including through the exchange of experiences, views, best practices, and actionable solutions, while identifying support needs to advance climate action in mountain regions through national instruments such as NDCs, NAPs, and BTRs;
- Ensuring that outcomes recognise the full mountain social-ecological system, encompassing water resources, biodiversity, food systems, health, settlements, infrastructure, cultural heritage, livelihoods, and downstream populations, rather than focusing narrowly on snow and glaciers;
- Ensuring equitable representation of the vulnerabilities and priorities of African mountain regions in global climate discussions, recognising their unique challenges and development contexts;
- Mobilising adequate and accessible support for climate adaptation in mountain regions, including for the establishment and strengthening of observation networks, hydrological monitoring, early warning systems, and other climate and hydrometeorological services.

Africa will not accept,

- outcomes that treat mountains as a cryosphere-only issue
- a global mountain agenda dominated by non-African regions or priorities
- language that disconnects mountain adaptation from ambitious mitigation
- data scarcity as a justification for delayed action or reduced support.

Linkages with other thematic;
Adaptation: Mountain priorities directly support the Global Goal on Adaptation, particularly around water, ecosystems, infrastructure, health, food systems, and livelihoods. Mountain adaptation can be reflected in NAPs, NDCs, BTRs and other national planning instruments.
Loss and Damage: Where climate impacts on mountains exceed adaptation limits such as irreversible ecosystem degradation, loss of livelihoods, cultural heritage, and displacement the mountain agenda connects strongly with loss and damage.
Climate finance: Mountain countries and communities require predictable, accessible and adequate finance for adaptation, including observation networks, hydrological monitoring, early warning systems, resilient infrastructure and ecosystem-based adaptation.

F: Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE)

The context for ACE,

The context for ACE,

- Africa recognises Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE), as set out in Article 6 of the UNFCCC and Article 12 of the Paris Agreement, as a critical enabler of effective climate action. Building resilient societies and achieving the objectives of the Convention and the Paris Agreement require informed citizens, strengthened institutions, empowered youth, inclusive participation, and sustained public engagement.
- Given Africa's demographic profile, rapid urbanisation, and development priorities, investment in ACE is fundamental to strengthening adaptive capacity, supporting just transitions, enhancing transparency, and accelerating the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). This requires predictable means of implementation, including finance, technology development and transfer, and long-term capacity-building.

Africa engages with a view to achieve,

- Recognition of ACE as a cross-cutting implementation pillar that supports adaptation, mitigation, loss and damage, transparency, technology development and transfer, capacity building, and a just transition.
- Predictable, adequate, new, and grant-based financial support for implementing national ACE strategies, programmes, and institutional frameworks in developing countries.
- Long-term institutional capacity-building that strengthens education systems, public institutions, research institutions, local governments, civil society organizations, local communities and Indigenous Peoples, youth, women, and children to participate effectively in climate action.
- Integration of climate change education, environmental literacy, and green skills development into formal, non-formal, and informal education systems.

- Strengthened public participation, access to information, and inclusive decision-making processes that ensure meaningful engagement of children, youth, women, local community and Indigenous Peoples, persons with disabilities, and vulnerable communities.
- Enhanced international cooperation to support knowledge exchange, South-South and triangular cooperation, regional centres of excellence, and digital learning platforms.
- Support for climate communication, public awareness campaigns, and access to climate. information that improves resilience and informed decision-making.
- Recognition of youth as partners in implementation through strengthened leadership opportunities, innovation, entrepreneurship, and climate employment initiatives.
- Integration of ACE outcomes into the Global Stocktake and the Enhanced Transparency Framework to strengthen accountability and demonstrate progress on implementation support.

Africa will not accept,

- Treatment of ACE as a voluntary or secondary component of climate action without dedicated implementation support.
- Fragmented, short-term, donor-driven projects that fail to build durable national institutions and long-term national ownership.
- Shifting the responsibility for financing ACE implementation onto developing countries without fulfilling developed countries' obligations under the Convention and the Paris Agreement.
- Limited participation of African stakeholders in the design, implementation, and evaluation of international ACE initiatives.
- Monitoring and reporting requirements that are not accompanied by adequate financial, technological, and capacity-building support.

Linkages

ACE is intrinsically linked to: Capacity-building, through strengthening national institutions and technical expertise; Finance, by ensuring dedicated, predictable, and grant-based support for implementation; Technology, by improving access to climate information, digital learning, and innovation; Adaptation, through improved resilience, community preparedness, and locally led solutions; Just Transition, by equipping workers, youth, and communities with green skills and supporting inclusive economic transformation; Enhanced Transparency Framework, by improving institutional capacities for reporting, stakeholder engagement, and climate information systems; National Development, by supporting implementation of NDCs, NAPs, Agenda 2063, and the Sustainable Development Goals.

G: Gender and climate change

The gender context include;

- A significant proportion of African women mostly dependent on subsistence agricultural farming, where they don't have land tenure right, and no collateral and access to credit, and this hampers their development as well as their families. Gender maybe crosscutting but it is recognized in the Paris Agreement and in decisions of the Convention since the Marrakech Accords.

- The Paris Agreement acknowledges that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity,

- The Paris Agreement further calls for capacity-building that is country-driven, based on and responsive to national needs, and foster country ownership of Parties, in particular, for developing country Parties, including at the national, subnational and local levels. Capacity-building should be guided by lessons learned, including those from capacity-building activities under the Convention, and should be an effective, iterative process that is participatory, cross-cutting and gender-responsive.

Africa engages with a view to,

- Achieve the effective implementation of the Belém Gender Action Plan requires predictable, adequate, and accessible finance, and under the Convention, develop and transfer environmentally sound technologies. and capacity-building support.

- Pursue gender-responsive climate finance, women's access to technology and land, participation and leadership, gender-disaggregated data, women's entrepreneurship, social protection and implementation of the Gender Action Plan.

- Stress the urgent need for enhanced means of implementation, including finance in line with Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement. The IPCC AR6 Africa Chapter finds with high confidence that climate change is worsening gender inequalities and increasing the vulnerability of African women and girls. Africa therefore call for strengthened gender-sensitive and responsive climate action that advances equity, inclusivity and country-driven priorities.

5

CONCLUSION

Key mėssages, strategic coherence and the way forward



5 Conclusion

Acrossevery thematic area of this Platform, Africa's position rests on a single foundation: the Paris Agreement understood in the context of the Convention, and consistency with the Convention's principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). Africa stands for a multilateral, rules-based climate system that respects the sovereignty of states and gives meaningful agency to all Parties, and rejects any interpretive drift that would dilute the Convention's rights, differentiation or development safeguards through practice, precedent or procedural attrition.

Africa stands for the proposition that climate ambition and development are not competing objectives. With Africa contributing less than four per cent of cumulative global emissions, developed countries carry a historical responsibility for the crisis. However, Africa bears the disproportionate impacts - of food and water insecurity, displacement, rising morbidity and mortality, and mounting pressure on fragile health and economic systems. This asymmetry between historical causation and present consequence is the foundational equity claim underlying every African position, across finance, mitigation, adaptation and technology and the cross-cutting themes of trade, mobility, health, agriculture and gender. Africa is therefore entitled to claim its fair share of the remaining global carbon budget, and to pursue differentiated, climate-resilient development pathways consistent with its right to sustainable development and poverty eradication under the Convention's Preamble and Articles 2 and 3 and the Paris Agreement Article 2.

Africa wants a Paris Agreement implemented as the Convention intended: an architecture of national communications, transparency and periodic collective assessment - not a re-negotiation, through NDCs, BTRs or the Global Stocktake, of obligations the Convention has already differentiated. Africa calls for developed countries to demonstrate progression in action and support consistent with Article 3, through credible ex ante finance communications under Article 9.5 and complete ex post reporting through Biennial Transparency Reports, since incomplete reporting undermines the Global Stocktake's ability to assess collective progress and characterise the pathways Africa actually needs. It wants every proposed outcome tested against three questions - does it preserve Africa's development space; does it protect differentiation and equity; does it strengthen the predictability, adequacy and quality of support - and wants those answers, not the pressure of any single session, to govern its positions; and it wants the structural impediments that have long constrained its development, in the Bretton Woods institutions, WTO trade rules, intellectual property regimes and the wider financial architecture, addressed as part of the climate response itself, consistent with the Convention's orchestration function.

What Africa will not accept follows from the same principles. It will not accept a regime that treats adaptation, loss and damage, or means of implementation as discretionary or philanthropic - these are obligations of historical responsibility, not favours extended. It will not accept finance strategies that lean on loans and private instruments in place of grant-based public finance, or a Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage left undercapitalised relative to assessed needs, and will not accept mitigation obligations, response measures or trade disciplines applied without differentiation, or that constrain Africa's energy access and industrialisation without

commensurate means of implementation. Nor will it accept its cross-cutting priorities - agriculture, human health, human mobility and gender - reduced to secondary status, or the securitisation of climate-related displacement outside multilateral, consensus-based UNFCCC processes. And it will not accept any interpretation of the Paris Agreement that erodes the Convention's differentiation, dilutes CBDR-RC, or shifts the responsibility for international cooperation asymmetrically onto developing countries. This is the compass by which Africa will assess every negotiating trade-off: development space preserved, differentiation and equity protected, and support that is predictable, adequate and of the quality the continent's needs demand.